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Abstract 
 
Starting with a large number of potential causes and indicators of the 2008 crisis, we 
select the best econometric model for explaining the severity of the crisis using a 
statistical methodology only guided by data, which is carried out employing a Genetic 
Algorithm. Our results show that such a model just contains one factor: “percentage of 
bank claims on private sector over deposits in the year 2006”, being very robust to 
alternative measures of the severity of the crisis. When lower penalty is considered for 
the introduction of factors in the model, the severity of the crisis is robustly explained 
by just two financial factors: “percentage of bank claims on private sector over deposits 
in the year 2006”, and “percentage in GDP of Domestic Credit Private Sector in the year 
2006”. In addition, the presence in the model of the geographical and non financial 
factor “Central/Eastern European or Central Asian” would suggest that these countries 
have received special impact during the crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In order to study the feasibility of an early warning system to predict the timing of the 
crises, Rose and Spiegel (2009) have studied the possibility of modeling the causes of 
the 2008 financial crisis and why its severity differs across countries. Their 
methodology treats the severity of the 2008 crisis as a latent variable, observed only 
imperfectly, and which is linked to four observable indicators of the crisis: the real GDP 
growth over 2008, the declines in the perception of a country’s creditworthiness, equity 
market collapses and exchange rate depreciations. In order to combine appropriately 
these four factors, a common component is extracted using conventional factor analysis. 
Additionally, to carry out a sensitivity analysis, three additional variants of this common 
component are produced, replacing the four observable indicators of the crisis with 
others obtained with similar, but alternative, methodologies. So, four different variables 
measuring the severity of the crisis, which are strongly positively correlated, are 
employed. 
 
As explanatory factors of the 2008 crisis, Rose and Spiegel (2009) have considered over 
sixty potential factors frequently studied in literature. It covers such categories as: 
financial system policies and conditions, asset price appreciation in real estate and 
equity markets, international imbalances and foreign reserve adequacy, macroeconomic 
policies, and institutional and geographic features. 
 
Starting with the previous paper by Rose and Spiegel (2009) and using their database, 
the main contribution of our paper consists of selecting the best econometric model for 
explaining the severity of the 2008 financial crisis from the potential factors frequently 
considered in the literature. We employ a purely statistical methodology which 
automatically selects the factors in the econometric model in a process only guided by 
data. Our methodology properly handles multicolineality problems in the estimations that 
could arise due to the redundancy of the information provided by the factors. Besides, it offers a 
parsimonious model of the severity of the crisis, containing few factors with as much 
information as possible that capture the essential characteristics of the data, and can help in 
identifying the main reasons explaining the crisis.  
 
2. Our methodology 
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In order to avoid data mining problems for constructing the best econometric model 
explaining the crisis, we follow the general to specific approach characteristic of the 
London School of Economics based on the theory of reduction [Hendry, 1995, ch. 9]. It 
means that given an endogenous variable Y, which represents the severity of the 2008 
crisis, and a set 
1,...., NX X  of sixty-plus potential factors explaining it, the problem that 
we face is to find the best submodel of the form: 
 
10 1
....
Ki K i
Y X X        , where     1 2, ...., 1,2,..., , 60Ki i i N K N   
 
The problem is that the number of submodels where the criteria developed by 
econometric theory for selecting the best model is 2N . So, for 60N  , the number of 
possible models is higher than 1810 . In order to resolve this intractable problem, we 
follow the heuristic strategy proposed by Hoover and Perez (1999) by searching all the 
feasible reduction paths when simplifying the general model. In particular, we use the 
methodology developed in Acosta-González and Fernández-Rodríguez (2007). This is a 
procedure for automatic selection of factors in the model, only guided by the data, 
which is carried out using a Genetic Algorithm where the lost function is the Schwartz 
Information Criterion (SIC, henceforth). This methodology avoids the tendency to over-
identify models detected in several popular heuristic methods for selecting models, like 
stepwise (Lovell, 1983). 
 
Therefore, starting with a large number of potential causes and indicators (over sixty 
possible explanatory factors) of the severity of the crisis considered in the literature, our 
methodology selects the best econometric model, in the sense of the SIC. 
 
The SIC advises choosing the econometric model which minimizes the expression 
2ˆ( ) log log( )
k
SIC m c N
N
                                                 (1) 
where 2
'
ˆ
e e
N
   is the variance of the residuals e , N is the sample size, and k is the 
number of factors in the model. 
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The correcting factor c  avoids the possibility of over-parameterized models and solves 
the trade-off between the in sample goodness of fit and the out of sample forecasting 
ability. The higher the value of c , the higher is the penalty for the introduction of more 
factors in the model.  
 
3. Empirical results 
Our data series, the same as employed by Rose and Spiegel (2009), were extracted from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics, and other key data sets. The entire (STATA 10.0) 
data set is available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/MIMICData.zip. 
 
In Table 1 and table 2 we present the results of applying our genetic algorithm in order 
to search for the best set of factors explaining the four versions of the severity of the 
crisis considered by Rose and Spiegel (2009). Depending on the value of parameter c  
in SIC, the number of factors explaining the crisis is different.  The case 2c   in 
equation (1), whose results are in Table 1, corresponds to a high reluctance to introduce 
many explicative factors. In this case, our final model contains a constant and the 
statistically significant financial factor “percentage of bank claims on private sector 
over deposits in the year 2006”. This factor is a ratio where the numerator corresponds 
to claims on private sector which include gross credit from the financial system (not 
included Central Bank) to individuals, enterprises, nonfinancial public entities not 
included under net domestic credit, and financial institutions not included elsewhere. Its 
denominator corresponds to transferable deposits included in Broad Money and other 
deposits included in Broad Money. This variable is a typical financial factor that was 
signaling the 2008 financial crisis since 2006. As can be seen, this model is very robust 
as shown in the sensitivity analysis since its explanatory role is maintained for all our 
measures of the severity of the crises. Only when the second version of the severity of 
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the crisis is considered, the best econometric model adds a second factor: “civil liberties 
in the year 2006”.  
 
Our finding could be consistent with Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) who conclude 
that financial crises throughout modern history can be viewed as “credit booms gone 
wrong”. Moreover, our results suggest that valuable information about macroeconomic 
and financial stability would be missed if central banks chose to ignore the behavior of 
credit aggregates and confine themselves to following inflation targeting rules. Indeed, 
policymakers are now taking a harder look at how to regulate credit and the 
procylicality of the financial system (e.g., Turner 2009).  
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
In the case 1c   in equation (1), where SIC permits more explanatory factors, the best 
econometric model depends on the endogenous variable representing the severity of the 
crisis. The results are presented in Table 2. 
[TABLE 2] 
It is important to observe that there is a predominance of financial factors describing the 
severity of the crisis, in the four cases. Macroeconomic policies and institutions are 
factors that appear occasionally. The rest of the factors never appear. So, for example, in 
the first model there are six financial factors, one macroeconomic policies factor and 
one geographical factor. Besides, there are two financial factors which were selected in 
each of the four models associated with the four severity measures: “percentage of bank 
claims on private sector over deposits in the year 2006”, variable that also was selected 
when 2c  , and “percentage in GDP of Domestic Credit Private Sector in the year 
2006”. A non financial factor given by the variable Central/Eastern European or Central 
Asian was also selected in three out of four endogenous variables describing the 
severity of the 2008 crisis. The appearance of this geographical and non financial factor 
(which is statistically significant in all of the cases) means that these European central 
Eastern countries and Central Asian Countries have received special impact during the 
crisis. Its negative sign reveals that this impact has been especially negative, and the 
magnitude of its coefficient measures, in any sense, the severity of the crisis. 
 6 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper has empirically tested the financial origins of the 2008 crisis. Our main result 
is that the intensity of the crisis seems to be strongly linked to financial factors which in 
2006 had been warning about the possibility of a financial crisis. This would suggest 
that the current crisis could have been anticipated by avoiding the strong increase in 
credit, revaluating the role of credit quantities and factors affecting the supply of credit 
in the conduct of monetary policy.   
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TABLE 1 
 
 
Severity of the crisis 1  (R2=0.2437) 
Factor name coefficient t-student p-value 
Constant 0.77060 3.76750 0.00010 
Bank Claims, % Deposits 2006 -0.76380 -4.62860 0.00000 
 
Severity of the crisis 2  (R2=0.3595) 
Factor name coefficient t-student p-value 
Constant 0.22840 1.05550 0.14680 
Bank Claims, % Deposits 2006 -0.60240 -4.44190 0.00000 
Civil Liberties, 2006 0.15070 3.93110 0.00010 
 
Severity of the crisis 3  (R2=0.2268) 
Factor name coefficient t-student p-value 
Constant 0.67480 3.36560 0.00050 
Bank Claims, % Deposits 2006 -0.66430 -4.23130 0.00000 
 
Severity of the crisis 4  (R2=0.1995) 
Factor name coefficient t-student p-value 
Constant 0.88290 4.26380 0.00000 
Bank Claims, % Deposits 2006 -0.85190 -4.86820 0.00000 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 
TABLE 2 
 
 
Severity of the crisis 1 (R2=0.4646) 
Factor name  coefficient t-student p-value 
Constant 0.4245 0.7813 0.2182 
Official Supervisory Power, 2003 0.0368 1.8709 0.0321 
Domestic Credit Private Sector, %GDP 2006  -0.0064 -3.3033 0.0007 
Private Sector Credit Access, 2006  0.1303 1.6968 0.0463 
Bank Liquid Reserves, %Assets 2006 -0.0068 -1.5687 0.0599 
Bank Capital, %Assets 2006 -0.0413 -1.0293 0.1528 
Bank Claims, %Deposits 2006 -0.6718 -3.283 0.0007 
CPI Inflation, 2006 -0.0389 -1.4273 0.0782 
Central/Eastern European or Central Asian -0.5003 -2.5317 0.0064 
 
 
Severity of the crisis 2 (R2=0.3930) 
Factor name  coefficient t-student p-value 
Constant 0.3914 1.7198 0.0442 
Domestic Credit Private Sector, %GDP 2006  -0.0030 -2.1998 0.0150 
Bank Claims, %Deposits 2006  -0.4693 -3.2717 0.0007 
Civil Liberties, 2006 0.1231 3.1611 0.0010 
 
 
Severity of the crisis 3 (R2=0.4033) 
Factor name  coefficient t-student p-value 
Constant 3.4799 2.7759 0.0033 
Domestic Credit Private Sector, %GDP 2006 -0.0056 -3.7641 0.0001 
Bank Claims, %Deposits 2006 -0.4683 -2.4470 0.0080 
Control of Corruption 0.2920 2.3781 0.0096 
Central/Eastern European or Central Asian -0.3678 -1.9292 0.0282 
Log(2006 Real GDP per capita) -0.2762 -2.1542 0.0167 
 
Severity of the crisis 4 (R2=0.3677) 
Factor name  coefficient t-student p-value 
Constant 0.8078 2.8442 0.0027 
Declaring Insolvency Power, 2003  0.2334 1.6306 0.0530 
Domestic Credit Private Sector, %GDP 2006  -0.0070 -3.2547 0.0008 
Bank Claims, %Deposits 2006  -0.6467 -3.4435 0.0004 
Regulatory Quality 0.3318 2.0794 0.0200 
Central/Eastern European or Central Asian -0.5500 -2.4697 0.0076 
 
 
 
 
 
